

10-27
42

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PART VII, OPRVINST 3750.63

2adv
1-10
EBN

Aer-MA-612/366

1-APR 1957

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VAM-11 AAR serial 2-56 concerning AJ-1, BuNo 124852, accident occurring 27 Oct 1956, pilot BROWNLEE

From: Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: Director, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1: Forwarded.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
COMAIRLANT
COMCARDEN-2
COMATG-202
CO, VAM-11

ORIGINAL

Code 101
15 JAN 1957

FOR THE ATTENTION OF on Valt-11 with ser 2-56, sub 1, 124632, accident
occurring 27 OCT 56 at lot BRYANLEN

From: Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-7)
Via: (1) Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics (ser-512)
(2) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of
the Aircraft Accident Board and in the remarks contained in prior
correspondence.

(b) (6)

Copy to:
COMNAVSTA/200
NAVSTA/200 (2)
CO, U.S. B. B. B. (174-15)
COMNAVSTA-200
CO, Valt-11

ORIGINAL

~~2~~
PB2/A29
31:GCT:st
Ser 4 4 2

20 DEC 1956

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on VAM-11 AAR per OZ-56 concerning AJ-1, 124892,
accident occurring 27 October 1956, Pilot BROWNER

From: Commander Carrier Division Two
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Op-57)
Via: (1) Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(2) Chief Bureau of Aeronautics
(3) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded, concurring with conclusions and recommendations of the
accident report.

2. The statement made in enclosure (8), addendum on BAILEY, J.R., with
regard to the crewman's having to stand is not concurred in. Although
the crewman must stand in order to open the pilot's escape hatch, this
can be accomplished just prior to the "break" when the aircraft has re-
duced speed, but before any low altitude turns have been made.

F. T. Ward,
F. T. WARD

Copy to:
CATC-202
CC, VAM-11

GVA15/A25
04:10:11
Ser: 2750

9 DEC 1956

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on VAM-11 AAR Serial 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124352
accident occurring 27 October 1956, Pilot BROWNE

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-5)
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division WO
(2) Commander Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(3) Chief Bureau of Aeronautics
(4) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VAM-11 AAR Serial 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124352, accident
occurring 27 October 1956, Pilot BROWNE

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the accident report.
2. It is considered however that the possibility exists that LCDR BROWNE suffered some type of physical breakdown at the time of this crash, as evidenced by enclosure (3).

D. F. Smith, Jr.
D. F. SMITH, JR.

Copy to:
CATC-202
OO, VAM-11

ATG-232/JHD/rr

A29

Serial: 158


20 NOV 1956

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on VAH-11 AAR Serial 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124852
accident occurring 27 October 1956, Pilot BROWNLEE

From: Commander Air Task Group TWO ZERO TWO
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)
Via: (1) Commanding Officer U.S.S. RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
(2) Commander Carrier Division TWO
(3) Commander Air Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(4) Chief Bureau of Aeronautics
(5) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VAH-11 AAR Serial 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124852, accident occurring
27 October 1956, Pilot BROWNLEE

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of
the accident report.


C. A. McDUGAL
Acting

5

•ORIGINAL•

VJH-11/11/dec

A25

Ser 4852

14 NOV 56

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VJH-11 AAR Serial 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124852, accident occurring 27 OCT 56, Pilot BROWNLEE

From: Commanding Officer, Heavy Attack Squadron ELEVEN

To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57)

Via: (1) Commander ATC 202

(2) USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)

(3) COMCVRDIV TWO

(4) COMAHLANT

(5) BUELER

(6) Director, U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VJH-11 AAR Ser 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124852, accident occurring 27 OCT 56, Pilot BROWNLEE

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the accident report.

2. It is apparent that any evaluation of the cause of this accident based upon the evidence available must be conjecture. Vertigo is a common cause of accidents to inexperienced pilots, but far less frequent in well qualified instrument pilots, such as LCDR BROWNLEE, who know the dangers of simultaneously combining instrument and contact flying and abandoning flight instruments for sensory impressions. For this reason, although vertigo seems the most likely cause of the accident, the following possibilities cannot be eliminated:

a. A malfunction of pressure altimeter system. Dangerous leaks were found in an airplane in another detachment at the time of the accident. The radio altimeter on the AJ is unreliable and a continuing maintenance problem.

b. Pilot distraction at night caused by such items as fire warning lights with the application of approach power settings, a hook warning light, jammed canopies and unsafe gear indications. The above items have been encountered on recent night flights and have proven to be highly disconcerting.

c. A serious sudden failure or malfunction at low altitudes that so engrossed the pilot that he failed to report his difficulties. The belief that crew members were not secured for landing lends some credence to the possibility that they were attempting to assist the pilot in some way.

3. LCDR BROWNLEE was a mature pilot and a capable and conservative AJ pilot with an excellent background in multi-engine instrument flying. He progressed normally in his pre-deployment training and ne

Subj: VAM-11 A/R Ser 02-56 concerning AJ-1, 124852, accident occurring
27 OCT 56, Pilot BROWNLEE

apprehension was detected in his approach to his new field of carrier aviation. During the week preceding the accident he flew 10 day hours, 2 night hours and made 1 carrier landing. His last night carrier landing was made 28 August 1956. He had had no accidents since reporting to this squadron in June 1955.

4. The dangers of night carrier landings have been repeatedly stressed in squadron night flying lectures with particular emphasis on having all items that might distract the pilot or require large power and trim changes accomplished prior to passing the starboard side when entering the pattern.
5. Four crew members are not required to operate the AJ and action has been initiated to restrict airborne troubleshooting of AJ equipment to daylight hours.
6. Action has also been initiated to insure pilots reporting to shipboard detachments a minimum of three day landings prior to a flight terminating in a night carrier landing.
7. The medical officer's addendum to the summary of UNDERWOOD's autopsy findings recommending that suitable flight gear be made available for non-crew members in a flight status is noted. Action is being taken to increase the squadron flight gear allowance.

E. C. MILDEN
E. C. MILDEN

Copy to:
Naval Aviation Safety Center (2)
COMINTWING ONE
BUAER (A/R 51)
BAR COLUMBUS OHIO
VAM ONE
VAM THREE
VAM FIVE
VAM SEVEN
VAM NINE
VAM TWO
VC SIX
FACRON FIFTY ONE
HATU
VAM ELEVEN DET 31
VAM ELEVEN DET 36
COMSIXTHFLT

7

PART I - GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD CONVENED BY: Heavy Attack Squadron ELEVEN (VAH-11)		2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 27 OCT 56	3. TIME: 2055B	4. CASE SERIAL NUMBER: 02-56
5. TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (Op-87)		6. ENCLOS. RES: (1) Witness statements		
7. VIA: ATG-202				
(2) USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)				
(3) CONCARDIV TWO				
(4) CONAIRLANT		10. Photographs (05)		
(5) BUAEIR		11. Aerological report		
(LAST) DIRECTOR, U.S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER		12. Medical Officer's report		
13. REPORTING OFFICER (14) DIFFERENT FROM REPORTING OFFICER		15. ACTUALLY OPERATING AIRCRAFT (16) DIFFERENT FROM REPORTING OFFICER		
17. KIND OF FLIGHT: TO LINE OF DUTY		18. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT		
3A1 <input type="checkbox"/> DAY <input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		35°-48N 250-32E		
19. PLACE OF LAST STOP: USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)		20. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA: Sea level		
21. TYPE: CLEARANCE <input type="checkbox"/> IFD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VFR <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LOCAL <input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONAL <input type="checkbox"/> AIRWAYS <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		22. FROM: CVA-15 TO: CVA-15		
23. TIME IN FLIGHT: 2.7		24. PHASE OF FLIGHT: Code B3 and/or B5 Code 7		
25. MODEL: AJ-1		26. SERIAL NUMBER: 124852		27. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
28. LIST MODEL: N/A		29. DOLLAR COST: \$1,442,000		30. AIRSPEED (KTS): 130 est.
				31. A/W WEIGHT: 36,500#

1. PERSONNEL		2. NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	3. RANK/RATE	4. FILE/SERVICE NO.	5. DESIGNATION	6. DATE DESIGNED	7. DATE OF DISCHARGE
PILOT (Person at controls at time of accident)		BROWNLEE, Orville S.	LTJR	(b) (6)	1310	7-1-44	(b) (6)
B/N		HELMS, Dewey F.	LTJG	(b) (6)	1355	N/A	
8. PERSONNEL		9. OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER		10. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED		11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	
		AVAILABLE? USED?					
PILOT		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Heavy Attack Squadron ELEVEN		<input type="checkbox"/> STANDARD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL	
B/N		<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	Heavy Attack Squadron ELEVEN		<input type="checkbox"/> B/A <input type="checkbox"/> SPECIAL	
TOTAL PILOT HOURS		ITEM	PILOT	CO-PILOT	STUDENT	ITEM	PILOT
ALL MODELS			4015.6			CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	27/4
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS			212.9			FCLP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	160/72
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS			28.7			INSTRUMENT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	*
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL			206.4			NIGHT HOURS, LAST 3 MONTHS	*
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 12 MONTHS			194.1			(jet accidents only) TOTAL JET PILOT HOURS	0
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL, LAST 3 MONTHS			28.7			DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	10-27-56
						DATE LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	2.7
13. ALL PERSONNEL		NAME (last, first and middle initial)		RANK/RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO.	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE
		BROWNLEE, Orville S.		LCDR	(b) (6)	VAH-11	A
		HELMS, Dewey F.		LTJG	(b) (6)	VAH-11	A
		BAILEY, Jimmie R.		AO2	(b) (6)	VAH-11	A
		UNDERWOOD, Basil M.		AQ1	(b) (6)	VAH-11	A
							HAAC L seat
							B/N R seat
							CM Radio
							CM Deck seat

PAGE 2

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

1. CEILING Clear		2. VISIBILITY 5 mi. Haze		3. WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY S 14		4. TEMPERATURE 67°F		5. DRY POINT 60°F		6. ALTITUDE SETTINGS 30.19							
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (windy aloft, icing levels, state of sea, etc., if pertinent to accident) Sea calm. Haze condition existing with no moon or horizon.																	
ITEM				P		S		ITEM				P		S			
PILOT ERROR								LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER ERROR									
CREW ERROR								OTHER PERSONNEL ERROR, Specify.....									
SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ERROR								ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR									
MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ERROR								AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES						X			
SERVICING PERSONNEL ERROR								WEATHER									
OTHER, Specify.....								OTHER, Specify.....									
FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIERS (Complete following Section on Pilot.)																	
1. DATE DEPLOYED 23 OCT 56				2. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED 3.0/1				3. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS 3.0/1									
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT 0				5. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED 2.7/0				6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS 2.7/0									
PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA																	
DATE OF MANUFACTURE		SERVICE TOUR		MONTHS IN THIS TOUR		TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS		FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL		FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE		TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED		FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST CHECK		NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK	
		ENGINE MODEL		SERIAL NO. OF ENGINE													
NO. 1																	
NO. 2																	
NO. 3																	
NO. 4																	
a. DID FIRE OCCUR: <input type="checkbox"/> BEFORE ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> AFTER ACCIDENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DID NOT OCCUR												b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					
c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE <input type="checkbox"/> AMP FOR SERIAL				d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO				e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED Unknown									
CHECK BELOW ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT																	
a. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT DESIGN				d. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNDETERMINED				g. <input type="checkbox"/> SURFACE FACILITIES									
b. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT				e. <input type="checkbox"/> TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION				h. <input type="checkbox"/> HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g. cockpit configurations)									
c. <input type="checkbox"/> MAINTENANCE				f. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER, Specify.....													
8. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION N/A				9. AIR SPEED N/A		10. OPERATING TEMPERATURE N/A		11. WEIGHT OF AIRCRAFT N/A		12. C.O. (N.M.M.) N/A		13. KIND OF FUEL 115/145		14. FUEL PRESSURE N/A			
15. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION N/A						16. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAMEOUT N/A											
17. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. Nos., give time since new or overhauled) N/A												18. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C Wing tip tanks					

(if additional space is necessary, attach additional sheet(s))

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

SECTION II - FACILITIES DATA PROVIDE THESE FACILITIES SHOULD BE DESCRIBED IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE ACCIDENT REPORT	4. <input type="checkbox"/> CLEARANCE AUTHORITY	8. <input type="checkbox"/> RUNWAY	9. <input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)
	5. <input type="checkbox"/> FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE	10. <input type="checkbox"/> WATER LANDING AREA	10. <input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (Field of Ship)
	6. <input type="checkbox"/> LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, etc)	11. <input type="checkbox"/> APPROACH ZONE	11. <input type="checkbox"/> CRASH AND RESCUE
	7. <input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)	12. <input type="checkbox"/> END ZONE	12. <input type="checkbox"/> SEARCH AND RESCUE
	13. <input type="checkbox"/> APPROACH AND EGRESS AIDS TO NAVIGATION	13. <input type="checkbox"/> SHOULDERS	13. <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPULT
	14. <input type="checkbox"/> RUNWAY WATCH	14. <input type="checkbox"/> TAXIWAY	14. <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
	15. <input type="checkbox"/> LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	15. <input type="checkbox"/> PARKING AREA	15. <input type="checkbox"/> BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
	16. <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify) _____		16. <input type="checkbox"/> FLIGHT DECK

17. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPULT <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR	18. PRESSURE SETTINGS	19. WIND OVER DECK	20. RELATIVE HEADING	21. APPROACH SPEED (SPN IS HEADING)
22. MARK NUMBER	23. MODEL NUMBER	24. LOCATION ON SHIP	25. LAUNCHING BRIDGE AND CONFIGURATION USED	
26. CATAPULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NUMBERS USED				

27. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) a major aircraft accident involves arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Minor accidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable components need not be reported.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT)	RAM TRAVEL (IN)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS		ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and number in service)
			CONSTANT PRESSURE (DOWN TR. 0-1)	CONSTANT RUN-OUT (WT. LOS.)		
DECK PENDANT						
DECK PENDANT						
BARRIER						
BARRIER						
BARRICADE						

PART III REMARKS (continue on separate pages if necessary)

PART	SECTION	ITEM	REMARKS
1	B	12	* Item not available this date. Pilots logbook either lost in accident or enroute. Will submit data under separate cover when available.

10

PART IV - SIGNATURES (INDI (b) (6))

CDR <i>J.H. Brown</i> (senior member) Executive Officer VAH-11 UNIT BILLET	(b) (6) Medical Officer ATC-202 (flight surgeon member)	(b) (6) Finance Officer VAH-11 UNIT BILLET
--	--	---

(3) DATE SUBMITTED 8 NOV 1956

V. The Accident:

LCDR ORVILLE S. BROWNLEE in AJ-1, BUNO 124852, was launched from the USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15) at 1816B on 27 October 1956. His regular flight crew was aboard with him, plus UNDERWOOD, B. M., AQL, who was riding as radar observer. The flight purpose was local night navigation and familiarization.

After approximately 2.0 hours of flight, LCDR BROWNLEE reported over the ship at 7000 feet altitude for the scheduled 2045B recovery. At about 2035B he was cleared to descend to 3000 feet and given the order of landing. He was to be the final recovery following a flight of three AD's. After all the AD's had reported in the landing pattern the AJ was cleared down to 1500 feet.

About 2050B, after the last AD had reported turning downwind, the AJ was cleared by the Air Officer to enter the landing pattern following the three AD's. He acknowledged this transmission and flew wide along the starboard side of the ship at about 800 feet stating that he was entering the pattern upwind. The aircraft then proceeded up ahead of the ship to a normal position for turning downwind and reported turning downwind. This was the last transmission heard from the plane. His position at that time was located at 35°-48'N 25°-32E.

After several unsuccessful attempts to raise the AJ on radio, the USS RANDOLPH along with the destroyers, USS GREENE and USS BORDELON, immediately returned to the last known position of the lost aircraft. The search continued throughout the night; this search force was joined by ships of COMPHIBGRUFOUR at approximately 0600B. The scene of the crash, marked by floating debris, was located shortly after first light Sunday, 28 October 1956. The search was discontinued at approximately 1100B, 28 October 1956.

The bodies of BAILEY and UNDERWOOD were recovered along with three helmets, two life jackets, the port wing tip tank, long range oil tank, oxygen bottle, UHF transceiver, sections of the shattered radome and numerous charts and publications. The ocean depth at the scene of the accident is 800 fathoms.

VI. Damage to Aircraft:

Since there were no witnesses to the aircraft accident, no accurate description can be given of damage to the plane. However, debris salvaged the following morning at the scene of the crash indicates that the plane broke on impact with the water.

VII. The Investigation:

The following matters pertinent to the accident were considered:

1. The aircraft was materially sound before the flight and in an "UP" status.

VII continued:

2. The pilot had a 3.0 hour day flight and one carrier landing the same day of the accident.

3. The pilot and all crew members were performing an authorized flight at the time of the accident.

4. The pilot was qualified at night for landings aboard angle deck carriers in AJ-1 aircraft.

5. The fatal flight was the pilot's first night carrier flight within the last thirty days.

6. Two way radio communications between the ship and aircraft were excellent up to the time of crash. No malfunctions of any nature were reported.

7. The aircraft was observed flying upwind in the landing pattern to a position ahead of the ship, at normal altitude and attitude.

8. There existed little or no horizon at the time of the accident and cases of vertigo were reported by pilots returning from flights the night of the accident.

VIII. The Analysis:

1. There was no evidence of material failure or malfunction.

2. Personnel safety equipment is covered in the Medical Officer's report. However, conditions of the bodies recovered, and the fact that they were recovered from the surface of the water, indicates that BAILEY and UNDERWOOD were probably not strapped in their assigned landing stations.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. The cause or causes of this accident are undetermined. However, it is considered the pilot may have experienced vertigo while making his turn into the downwind leg.

2. It is recommended:

(a) That all pilots be reminded of the danger of this upwind turn and to rely on instrument flying rather than visual reference under conditions where the horizon is partially obscured.

(b) That early securing of all crew members in their assigned spaces be emphasized. Particular attention should be made to an early completion of the landing check-off list prior to turning to the downwind leg with a positive report that all members are secure and ready for landing.

STATEMENT OF CDR (b) (6)
and crew.

USN Concerning the loss of AJ-1 BuNo 124852

I was in Primary Fly during the night recovery on 27 October 1956. Radio communications with all planes in the air was good and CDR (b) (6) the Assistant Air Officer, was directing the flow of landing traffic by radio. He made one or two information transmissions to the AJ-1 concerning the number of AD's left to land. These transmissions were receipted for and when the AD count got down to three, the AJ-1 was directed to enter the landing pattern. The pilot again receipted for the transmissions and stated that he was entering the pattern upwind. At this time I noticed the running lights of three AD aircraft and the tail light of the AJ-1 as he commenced his turn upwind ahead of the carrier. I then directed my attention to the landing AD's. When the third AD landed, I tried to visually find the AJ-1 on the downwind leg and was unsuccessful. CDR (b) (6) made several transmissions on the radio attempting to locate the aircraft. CDR (b) (6) called the Captain and informed him that the aircraft was missing. All lights on the ship were turned full on and searchlights were used in attempt to spot any wreckage or survivors. Two destroyers also assisted and numerous passes were made through the area where the aircraft went down, with negative results.

(b) (6)

13

ENCLOSURE

1

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER (b) (6) U. S. Navy, USS RANDOLPH
(CVA-15), concerning accident of 27 October 1956:

I was in primary flight control at the time of the accident. AJ1, BuNo 124852, Pilot Brownlee, was in the immediate vicinity of the USS Randolph at about 2025B awaiting the scheduled 2045B recovery. The scheduled recovery consisted of 3 F2H's, 6 AD's and the AJ. At about 2050 the AJ was cleared to enter the landing pattern and was informed that 3 AD's were ahead of him in the pattern. At about 2055B the pilot reported being upwind, entering the pattern. That was the last transmission received. At about 2058B, I notified the Captain that we had lost contact and that I was concerned about him. At 2100 I called the Captain and recommended that we turn back to our 2055 position, that I thought he had flown into the water.

(b) (6)

Commander, U. S. Navy
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)

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ENCLOSURE 2

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER (b) (6) U. S. NAVY, USS
RANDOLPH (CVN-15), concerning accident of 27 October 1956:

At approximately 2025B AD-1, BuNo 124852, with radio call R-51, reported to me on the land/launch frequency, stating that he was at 7000 feet and I believe giving his fuel state as 2800 pounds. Five to ten minutes later I lowered R-51 to 3000 feet, giving him the landing order. R-51 was following a flight of three (3) AD's, then at 2500 feet. Later as the AD's entered the landing pattern for a downwind break, R-51 was lowered to 1500 feet. As the last AD stated he was breaking upwind, R-51 was given a Charlie and the position of the AD he was following. When the AD was at 180° position I asked R-51 for his position and his reply was, either I am turning upwind or going upwind. Shortly thereafter I believe I saw an aircraft tail light forward of the ship at the proper altitude. This was at approximately 2055B and the last transmission I received from R-51. After the AD was on deck I looked for the AJ's lights on the down wind leg, and not seeing the lights, again called, getting no answer. At approximately 2058, Air Operations, Combat and the Captain were notified that Primary Fly had last contact with R-51.

The latest altimeter setting is available in primary fly, but not given to aircraft unless asked for. I had given the setting to some aircraft prior to the launch, but do not remember giving the setting during or prior to this recovery.

(b) (6)

Commander, U. S. Navy
USS RANDOLPH (CVN-15)

15

ENCLOSURE 6

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT (b) (6) U. S. Navy, VAW-12,
DET 36, serving on board the USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15), concerning accident of
27 October 1956:

On the night of 27 October 1956, at about 2045B, I was the second AD5W of three to break downwind at 1500 feet off the port quarter of the Randolph. The aircraft was side number 704, BuNo 132789 and call "Anyface Six." As I came upwind at 1000 feet on the starboard side of the Randolph I noticed the lights of four aircraft in the landing pattern, the lead AD5W up ahead, and the third AD5W flown by LTJG (b) (6) coming behind me in a port/turn about the stern. I also could see the lights of an aircraft off my port wing headed downwind abeam the port side of the ship. I feel quite certain this was the AJ.

Hardgrove Tower ordered the AD5W's to go around once more before joining the landing pattern. As I turned at 1000 feet downwind of the carrier I again noticed the lights of AD5W, BuNo 139557, following me and further back, also outboard, the red wind and white tail light of the AJ. Two aircraft appeared in the pattern as LCDR (b) (6) in AD5W BuNo 135783 broke up ahead of me. Then as I passed the ship on the starboard beam I heard Hardgrove Tower notify the AJ it was clear to enter the landing pattern and break. I heard the pilot answer "Roger".

I turned downwind up ahead of the ship and saw 139557 approaching off my port side at a lower altitude. I could see the tail light of 135183 up ahead of me going downwind. Also I saw the white light of a plane off the starboard quarter of the ship wide out. That was the last I saw or heard from the AJ as I concentrated on my landing.

(b) (6)

LTJG, U. S. Navy,
VAW-12, DET-36,
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)

16

ENCLOSURE

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT (JUNIOR GRADE) (b) (6)
U. S. NAVAL RESERVE, VAW-12, DET-36, serving on board the USS RANDOLPH
(CV-15), concerning accident of 27 October 1956.

I was the pilot of AD5W, BuNo 139557 on the night of 27 October 1956. I was the last man in a flight of three (3) AD5W's. We had just made a downwind break when the tower told us to hold our altitude for another circuit as the pattern was too crowded. At this time, coming up astern the ship at 1000 feet, I noticed the AJ wide to the starboard side of the ship. I continued in a wide circle at 1000-1500 feet and abeam the port side I began letting down for a break. I noticed an aircraft slightly inside and behind me which I thought was AD5W, BuNo 132789, and another aircraft in front and outside of me which I thought was the AJ. As I came alongside the ship AD5W BuNo 132789 called breaking and the aircraft ahead and to the right of me went into a port turn over me. I then realized that the AJ was the plane behind me. Later, as I was flying downwind, I heard the AJ call the tower that he was breaking upwind. That was the last transmission I heard. I was parked and out of my plane by the time anyone knew the plane was missing.

(b) (6)

LTJG, U. S. Naval Reserve
VAW-12, DET 36,
USS RANDOLPH (CV-15)

17

ENCLOSURE

USS RANDOLPH CVA-15
AEROLOGICAL OFFICE

27 OCTOBER 1956

2055B

ACCIDENT REPORT

Ship's course and speed	170 degrees	26 knots
Relative wind	350 degrees	39 knots
True wind	141 degrees	14 knots
Weather	Clear with haze	
Visibility	5 miles-haze	
Pressure	1022.4 millibars	
Altimeter	30.19 inches	
Temperature	67.5 degrees F.	
Dew point	60 degrees F.	
Sea State	Slight-two foot sea from the southeast	
Sea water temperature	68 degrees F.	

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LT, USN
AEROLOGICAL OFFICER

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ENCLOSURE

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

- This report shall be filed in the event of an aircraft accident/incident which involves one or more of the following:
Death
Injury
Bail-out or Ejection (attempted or successful)
Whenever physiological or psychological factors are involved
Aircraft Ground Accidents resulting in serious injury
- Completion of the form shall be the responsibility of the flight surgeon.
- For type accident and damage code refer to OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6A.
- This form shall be prepared in quadruplicate. One copy shall be turned over to the Aircraft Accident Board or the District and

Intelligence Officer in the case of combat incidents; and the original shall be airmailed (regular mail within 250 miles of Washington, D.C.) direct to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-57) Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. within 4 working days following the accident. The third copy shall be mailed direct to Safety Equipment Branch, BUAEH, Navy Department, Washington 25, D.C. The fourth copy shall be forwarded direct via air mail (regular mail within 250 miles of Norfolk, Va.) to the U.S. Naval Aviation Safety Activity, Naval Air Station, Norfolk 11, Virginia. Where more than one aircraft is involved, separate forms must be completed for each aircraft wherein one or more of the requirements in paragraph 1. above are applicable. (Additional copies may be prepared for use of squadron flight surgeons and other interested individuals.)

1. FROM (Date of Execution 3750-12)		2. SERIAL NO.	3. ACCIDENT OR UNDES. (Geographic Location)	4. TIME (Local)	5. DATE
13-56H		37 48' N 29 32' E	2059H	10/27/56	
6. PLANE COVERED BY THIS REPORT	7. OTHER PLANE (if involved)	8. NO. OCCUPANTS	9. UNIT OPERATING AIRCRAFT	10. TYPE ACCIDENT	11. DAMAGE
AJ-1		4	VAH-11	B-3	A
12. NAME OF PILOT IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT (Serial Number)		13. PILOT ATTACHED TO			
BRANCH, Orville Meehl		VAH-11			
14. FLIGHT SURGEON'S CHECK LIST		15. SIGNATURE			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED <input type="checkbox"/> SURVIVOR NARRATIVES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PHOTOS AS NEEDED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> COPIES FURNISHED		DATE 12-8-56 DATE 12-8-56			
16. REPORT FILED BY		17. SIGNATURE			
(b) (6)		LT. J. B.			
(b) (6)		COR. J. B.			
18. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT		<input type="checkbox"/> AIRCRAFT INCIDENT		<input type="checkbox"/> COMBAT INCIDENT	
<input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT					

13. ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

INCLUDE THREE PARAGRAPHS GIVING A BRIEF BUT FACTUAL ACCOUNT DESCRIBING THE ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. INCLUDE SUCH CAUSES AS KNOWN, ESTIMATES OF "G" FORCES, ANGLES OF IMPACT, SPEED ON IMPACT, ATTITUDE ON IMPACT, ETC. ATTACH PHOTOGRAPHS WHEN PERTINENT.

This AJ-1 was returning to the carrier from a routine night navigation hop. All was normal as the plane flew up wind, called the break, and began to turn downwind. The night was VFR but extremely dark and without any horizon. Thus the landing was more than partially instrument. The plane failed to appear downwind to turn base. Apparently the pilot attempted to fly instruments with occasional glances at the ship to be sure of where he was, got vertigo in the turn, and flew into the water.

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14. PILOT FACTORS (Check pertinent pilot factors listed below)

	PILOT	CO-PILOT		PILOT	CO-PILOT
IN CONTROL AT TIME OF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		HYPOXIA SUSPECTED	No	
AMOUNT OF FLIGHT TIME IN LAST 24 HOURS	3.0		CARBON MONOXIDE POISONING SUSPECTED	No	
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN LAST 24 HOURS	1		FAULTY VISION	No	
FLYING HOURS DUTY IN LAST 24 HOURS	0		AERODEMOLISM	No	
HOURS SINCE LAST FULL MEAL	4		BLACKOUT, GREYOUT, REDOUT	No	
TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT	3		VERTIGO	Yes	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	4015		NIGHT BLINDNESS	No	
TOTAL FLIGHT TIME IN MODEL	206		FATIGUE	No	
NUMBER PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS	Unknown		DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES	No	
DATE OF LAST ACCIDENT	-		UNFAMILIARITY IN TYPE AIRCRAFT	No	
NUMBER DAYS GROUND IN LAST MONTH	0		ANXIETY REACTION	No	
DATE LAST LOA PRESSURE INDOCTRINATION	Unknown		LAST CEN (date and score)	Unknown	
AMOUNT SLEEP IN LAST 24 HOURS	8		OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS IN ACCIDENT (describe below)		

15. COMMENTS ON ITEMS CHECKED UNDER ITEM 14 WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO ACCIDENT/INCIDENT. IF NONE APPLICABLE, COMMENT BELOW ON ANY OF THE ABOVE FACTORS AFFECTING CREW MEMBERS OR PASSENGERS.

See Addendum #1

ENCLOSURE (8)

ADDENDUM: #1, Page 1 #15

15. This green card pilot was considered the best instrument man in the detachment, having over 4,000 hours of flight time, much in a VR outfit. He had a total of 19 1/2 hours in the AJ type aircraft which is considered far in excess of adequate for familiarity. He had, however, only five night carrier landings. Two such landings are necessary for night VFR qualification, and six for all weather night qualification. The night of the accident was VFR with good visibility but totally without an horizon. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

The turn downwind at night is a standard instrument turn but is done in order to come into a precise relationship with the ship, and it is therefore tempting to glance over the shoulder and see the ship. This has often in the past led to loss of orientation and a water crash, as witnessed by surviving pilots. While it is impossible to prove that there was not an electric or power failure, or anything else, the lack of a Mayday call or other evidence of emergency, and in view of the many other aircraft that have flown into the water in that exact same position (b) (5)

(b) (5)

Item 15, page 1: new information from health record:

Summary of pertinent facts from the Abstract

1/6/48 Pneumothorax

3/21/48 Fleury's, Serofibrinous

10/6/52 Pericarditis, Serofibrinous acute, benign

and from #28, Standard Form 88:

ADDENDUM: #1, Page 1 #15 continued.

"History of spontaneous pneumothorax in January 1948. Bed rest for three months and no evidence of acid fast infection found. Since then completely asymptomatic with no residuals. Physical examination of chest negative. HCD."

There is no record of what examinations were made, or what qualified opinions were obtained at the time of the above listed illnesses.

(b) (5)



his radio voice was perfectly calm and normal as was the last observed performance of the aircraft one or two minutes before it disappeared.

SUMMARIES OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT, INJURY AND CAUSE

1. Use separate form for each person.
2. Under Injury Class, use following key:

Class "A" Fatal injury, is considered for reporting procedure as described herein in death prior to submission of the Aircraft Accident Report.
Class "B" Critical injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury which threatens or results in death either from injuries sustained in the accident or from complications thereof. Critical injuries resulting in death within 30 days shall be reported by letter to the original addressee.
Class "C" Serious injury is considered for reporting procedure as injury less than critical but definitely requiring five or more days hospitalization involving medical treatment but from which the individual will be expected to recover. Unreported critical conditions or complications exceptionally.

- Class "D" Minor injury is considered for reporting procedure as not injury less than serious.
Class "E" No injury.
Class "F" Unknown injury. Class was determined as follows:
Class "N" Unknown injury. Class was determined as follows:
Class "O" Other disposition: see following key:
Class "P" Grounded.
Class "Q" Cracked and repaired on duty.
Class "R" Hospitalized.
Class "S" Remains recovered.
Class "T" Remains not recovered.

NAME HISMA, Dewey Franklin		FILE NO. (b) (6)		AGE 25	WEIGHT 200	HEIGHT 73"
DUTY ASSIGNMENT, ON OCCASION Boeing-737 Navigator				POSITION OCCUPIED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Cockpit-right		INJURY CLASS A
II. SAFETY EQUIPMENT		MODEL/TYPE	AVAILABLE	USED	NOT USED	DAMAGED
SHOULDER HARNESS		NAP 31197A	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LAP BELT		NAP 1808-6	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
INERTIA REEL		Douglas Aircraft	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
"G" SUIT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HELMET		H-3	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OXYGEN MASK			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GOOGLES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SHOCK (type)		High Guts	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FLIGHT SUIT, OTHER THAN "G" (type)		Summer	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EXPOSURE SUIT (type)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER (specify)		Line Vest	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. COMMENT ON EFFECTIVENESS (Failure of "No," "None," or "Not," etc., will not be accepted. If any equipment failed, describe failure and probable cause. Use additional sheet, if necessary.) Helmet retrieved, strap not buckled.						
13. IN CASE OF BURNS, FREEZING, OR FROSTBITE, LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET, IF NECESSARY.						

13. POST CRASH EXAMINATION	
13.1. LEAD, LIST PRIMARY CAUSE (Indicate whether or not): Presumed Drowned	INTERNAL INJURY
13.2. AUTOPSY FINDINGS, IF PERFORMED	IF HOSPITALIZED, DATE, CLINICAL
ESTIMATED LENGTH OF HOSPITALIZATION	ESTIMATED LENGTH OF DROWNING
EXAMINER'S NAME, COND. TEST, RESULT	
IF DROWNED, REASON	

14. INJURIES											
DEGREE	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	1ST	2ND	3RD	DAMORIZATION ENTIRE BODY	
										AREA	HEAD (ventral) (dorsal)
UNCONSCIOUSNESS	<input type="checkbox"/> SHORT DURATION, LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (specify)										
HEAD	CEREBRAL CONCUSSION <input type="checkbox"/> MINOR <input type="checkbox"/> SERIOUS <input type="checkbox"/> CRITICAL <input type="checkbox"/> FATAL						MINOR FACIAL INJURIES				
INJURIES	MINOR EYE INJURIES <input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT EYE <input type="checkbox"/> LEFT EYE						MAJOR EYE INJURIES <input type="checkbox"/> RIGHT EYE <input type="checkbox"/> LEFT EYE				
TYPE	BONES: CRANIAL, FACIAL, CERV., THOR., LUMBAR, SACRAL, COCCYX, SHOULDER GIRDLE, RIBS, PELVIS, UPPER ARM, LOWER ARM, HAND, UPPER LEG, LOWER LEG, FOOT.										
SIMPLE FRACTURE											
COMPOUND FRACTURE											
COMMINUTED FRACTURE											
DISLOCATION	JAW, SHOULDER, ELBOW, WRIST, HIP, KNEE, ANKLE										
CAUTION	HAND, FOOT										

AREA OF INVOLVEMENT	LACERATIONS			CONTUSION/SBRRAIN/STRAIN			ABRASIONS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DROWNED
	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	MILD	MODERATE	SEVERE	
NECK	VENTRAL									SHOCK <input type="checkbox"/> MILD <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE
	DORSAL									
THORAX	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
ABDOMEN	VENTRAL									
	DORSAL									
EXTREMITIES (upper)										
EXTREMITIES (lower)										

15. CAUSE OF INJURIES (Give opinion as to cause of each injury indicated above. Give specific parts of aircraft involved. Entries of "No," "None," "Determined on impact," or "Undetermined" with no amplification will not be accepted. Use additional sheet, if necessary.)

[illegible]

SUMMARY OF AUTOPSY FINDINGS

on

UNDERWOOD, Basil Martin, AGL, (b) (6) USN

Conducted on USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15) on 28 October 1956

EXTERNAL:

(b) (6)



INTERNAL:

(b) (6)



Cause of death: Drowning and shock.

(b) (6)



Respectfully submitted,

(b) (6)



LT. RO. USNR

Addendum

UNDERWOOD, Basil Martin, AQL, (b) (6) USN

/12 Page 2

(b) (5)



This man was in a flying status as a non-crew member. As such he had no log book and therefore no flight clothing of his own. He was wearing dungarees and an antique helmet full of bolt heads, secondary missiles, and fastened by a cloth chin strap.

At their home base this squadron maintains a flight gear pool for such men, but no pool is available aboard ship.

Flying in dungarees and borrowed, poorly fitting safety equipment unnecessarily endangers the limbs, and often the lives of these non-crew members. It is recommended that steps be taken to allow the fairly small number of them in the Navy to draw personal flight gear.

Further, squadron safety officers or flight surgeons should periodically inspect crewmen's safety equipment to eliminate many ingenious and dangerous innovations.

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ITEM LOST	WAS OXYGEN
-----------	------------

BASE OF BURNS, FREEZING OR CHEMISTRY: LIST ALL CLOTHING WORN. USE ADDITIONAL SHEET. **See addendum**

13. POST CRASH EXAMINATION

Results awaited

INJURIES				TOTAL
MIND EYE INJURY				

[illegible]

FRATLINE

[illegible][illegible]

AREA OF	LACERATIONS	CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN	OTHER

100-443887-1000 (b) (6)

SPR	EXPOSURE

	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE
--	-----------------------------------	-----------------------------------

THREATS (upper)		<input type="checkbox"/> MILD	<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE
THREATS (lower)		<input type="checkbox"/> MILD	<input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE
CAUSE OF INJURY			

16. CAUSE OF INJURIES (If aircraft involved was not damaged, or if damaged with no explanation will not be accepted. Give specific parts of aircraft involved. Entries of "No," "None," "Unexplained" or "Not known" will not be accepted.)

SUMMARY OF AUTOPSY FINDINGS
on
BAILEY, Jimmie Ray, AO2, (b) (6)

USN

Conducted on USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15) on 28 October 1956

EXTERNAL:

(b) (6)



INTERNAL:

(b) (6)



ADDITIONAL:

(b) (6)



SUMMARY OF AUTOPSY FINDINGS on BAILEY, Jimmie Ray, AC2, (b) (6) USN
Conducted on USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15) on 28 October 1956

(b) (6)

Cause of death: Drowning.

Respectfully submitted,

(b) (6)

LT MC USNR

(b) (6)

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Addendum

BAILEY, Jimmie Ray, A02, (b) (6) USN

/12 Page 2

(b) (5)



DITCHING AND WATER CRASH REPORT

CONTROLLING WEATHER:		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> WATER CRASH	
WEATHER	SEA	WIND	WAVE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> B. LIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE	<input type="checkbox"/> LIGHT	<input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE
14	67°	70°	
PROCEDURES			
JETTISONED		DITCHED	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GREN.	<input type="checkbox"/> GREN.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GREN.	<input type="checkbox"/> GREN.
<input type="checkbox"/> CLOTH	<input type="checkbox"/> CLOTH	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOTH	<input type="checkbox"/> CLOTH
IMPACT (Estimated)		IMPACT (Estimated)	
ATTITUDE	ANGLE	IMPACT (Estimated)	STOPPING DISTANCE (Feet)
Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
EXIT		EXIT	
NAME		NAME	

NAME	RELAT.	UNDERWATER	PLACE OF EXIT	DIFFICULTIES
BRADSHAW, Neville Siegel	Pilot		None	Double brace
HUGHES, Daisy Franklin	Bombardier-Navigator		None	under A. B.
BAILEY, Jessie Ray	Crewman	Thrown	Clear	C. and D.
UNDERWOOD, Neil Martin	Passenger	Thrown	Clear	

No Information	
No Information	
Body thrown clear.	
Body thrown clear.	

3-1

7. SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT											
SHOES		GLOVES		LIFE VEST		EXPOSURE SUIT		RAFT		USED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION	
TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED	TYPE	DAMAGED
High	None	None	None	HE II	None						
High	None	None	None	HE II	None						
High	None	None	None	HE II	None						
High	None	None	None	HE II	None						

REMARKS: Great Relief. First observation from air, first torn open at bottom, one set of straps torn away.

ANY DIFFICULTIES OR FAILURES IN USE OF SURVIVAL GEAR (Use additional sheet, if necessary)

1. TIME IN RAIN

2. TIME IN WATER

3. METHOD OF RESCUE

4. LIST EQUIPMENT DROPPED TO SURVIVORS: STATE IF USED EFFECTIVELY (Use additional sheet, if necessary)

5. LIST ALL ITEMS IN SURVIVAL KIT WHICH WERE USED: EFFECTIVENESS (List those needed items which failed or were lost - Use additional sheet, if necessary)

6. INCLUDE SURVIVOR NARRATIVES





All Helmets
FRACTURED







